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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the Swedish Moderates’ transformation under Fredrik 
Reinfeldt. The question at issue is as follows: What motive(s) were behind the 
Moderates’ declared transformation after Reinfeldt became party leader? We 
define the actor who possesses the motives, which is Reinfeldt and his closest 
associates, and the action we want to explain.  
Indications of what motives the actor had are given in four separate chapters 
that together form the foundation of our conclusion. We examine (A) the actor’s 
stated motives, (B) the actor’s previous motives, (C) other similar actor’s motives 
and (D) motives behind parties’ actions in general. 
We received strong support for viability and societal change which indicates 
that the Moderates changed in order to make the policies more viable and to adapt 
to certain changes in the society. Vote-maximisation got support, although not as 
strong as viability and societal change. Still, there is a possibility that vote-
maximisation was very important for the Moderates. The motive is often denied 
by parties and is therefore more difficult to find evidence for. However, 
considering the support we have found in our material, we argue that vote-
maximisation probably was of great importance for the Moderates.  
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1 Introduction 
The subject we are dealing with in this thesis was not, originally, of great interest 
to us. As a matter of fact, we did not plan to write about Swedish politics. Our 
original idea revolved around the study of states who either had “failed” or were 
on the verge of “failing”. We were very intruigued by a handful of problems all of 
these states seem to face; difficulties regarding foreign-aid distribution being one 
of them. After several discussions regarding choice of topic we found ourselves 
moving away from this original field of study and towards other subjects within 
other political science fields. These discussions were all taking place during 2006. 
Or to be more specific, shortly after the Swedish election to the national 
parliament in september. 
The four parties in the right wing alliance won a majority of the seats in the 
Swedish parliament in the 2006 election. The major reason behind the change was 
that the conservative Moderates greatly increased their share of votes compared to 
their prior election. The success was commonly explained as consequence of the 
Moderates’ transformation. After the election 2002 the party elected a new party 
leader and the party’s rhetoric became softer, dealing with peoples everyday life 
instead of their traditional tax-reduction policies. This change of direction sparked 
our interest in the field of Swedish politics. Rather than discussing our ideas 
regarding our original thesis, that of failed states, we found ourselves discussing 
this political party’s declared transformation. So, as a consequence, we decided to 
continue these discussions and explore them even deeper in the thesis you are 
about to read.  
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2 Problem and Statement of Purpose 
2.1 Problem 
The 2002 election turned out to be a disaster for the Moderates, gaining only a 
15,2% support compared to 22,9% in the election of 1998. The party was in need 
of reform. The task of transforming the party was delegated to Fredrik Reinfeldt 
(Wiklund, 2006:86ff). Reinfeldt and his closest associates started a renewal of the 
party, creating the epitaph the new labour party, and in 2005 the leader officially 
announced the birth of the New Moderates: 
 
The task I was given was to restore the Moderates after a tough election loss, to 
renew and develop the Moderates in a new age and to develop the Moderates 
from the challenges that the people in Sweden go through. 
(The Moderates’ party conference, 2005-08-26). 
 
This is rather interesting since this particular party has been sceptical regarding 
party reforms. Prior to Reinfeldt, the Moderates had “from the 1970:s and 
onwards developed into a strong ideologically convinced party with a stable 
political program” (Håkansson, 2005:92, Bäck – Möller, 2003:67). We are not 
alone in notifying this change. One popular opinion, particularly in the media, has 
been that the Moderates have moved towards the middle on the political left/right 
scale, from their original position on the right. A full and comprehensive insight 
into the true motives behind the transformation is yet to be fulfilled. We are 
therefore inclined to reveal the motive(s) behind the supposedly changed 
Moderates. The main question at issue is as follows: 
 
What motive(s) were behind the Moderates declared transformation after 
Reinfeldt became party leader? 
 
The question below is also of importance, yet this will only be answered indirectly 
and in connection to the first question. It will not be analysed independently. 
 
Why did the Moderates apply their particular approach and why did this 
transformation take place during this particular period? 
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2.2 Statement of purpose  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine Sweden’s Moderate-party and why the 
new leadership started a renewal of the party in 2003. We are interested in the 
motives behind this change and why this particular approach was implemented in 
this particular period1. We are only interested in the party’s motives behind the 
declared transformation; we will not investigate whether a change of political 
content actually took place2. This is interesting because it says something about 
the Moderates and how the party functions. The thesis will also say something 
about why the Moderates won the election since the Moderates’ way of acting 
proved to be successful in the election in 2006.  
     Our future conclusions are not to be generalised onto other parties. However, 
the conclusions could be vital for an understanding of contemporary politics, 
primarily in Sweden. The thesis will provide information on the political climate 
and the context in which parties act. Hopefully, the thesis will open up a debate 
regarding the political arena itself since it concerns, for example, party relations 
towards citizens and members, the autonomy of the party elite, how it 
coincides/conflict with democratic values etc. These questions are not to be 
analysed by us. Rather, we hope for a cumulative process to take place where the 
questions above are to be handled by researchers alike and strengthen our 
knowledge in the field of party-politics. 
Some research has been made regarding “New Moderates”. By comparing 
speeches held by several of the Moderates leaders, Thorstensson (2006) wonders 
whether Reinfeldt upholds a different ideology than the previous leaders. We 
differ from Thorstenssons thesis’ purpose by investigating the motives behind the 
rhetoric change. Several non-scientific writings have also been published (see 
Ljunggren, 2006, Wiklund 2006 etc.). These writings are different from our 
purpose; none of them thoroughly investigate the real motives behind the the 
Moderates’ change. One must keep in mind that the limited existence of research 
on the matter is not strange considering that the change started only a couple of 
years ago. Also, Håkansson remarks that parties’ strategic considerations in 
general are not studied remotely as much as other parts of party behaviour 
(2005:100). These examples show that there is a great void waiting to be filled. 
We intend on doing just that. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 Note that we are not going to explain why a specific actor possesses specific motives by, for 
example, review their childhood. However, our actors’ previous political stands are interesting in 
this thesis since they have claimed that they have had the same views for a longer period of time. 
Our interest is delimited to the actors grown up life though. This is explained further in the 
method-section. 
2 Political content, we argue, is official standpoints on specific issues. For example, the party’s 
national budget-propostion, proposed motions in the parliament and decisions taken in party 
conferences. Declared transformation, we argue, is more general standpoints. For example, debate 
articles and statements in interviews. 
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3 Theory 
In this chapter the thesis’ theoretical framework is presented. First, we describe 
the theoretical foundation that our thesis rests upon. Second, we outline strategic 
motives that parties are expected to have according to theorists. 
3.1 Theoretical perspective 
The conclusions of an analysis of party behaviour will differ depending on which 
perspective one chose to apply. Here we will discuss our perspective and contrast 
it to some of the other major perspectives regarding party behaviour.  
We are interested in the actions of a certain actor, the Moderates, and we 
argue that it is possible to distinguish a group of people who can be said to act, at 
least partly, in an autonomous way (see ch. 5). The actions carried out by the party 
are preceeded by considerations and are therefore rational to some extent; the 
party acts in the way which is conceived to correspond most accurately with the 
party’s wishes. This idea was uplifted by Downs (1957) who saw parties as self-
driven mechanisms existing only for the sake of power. We do not agree even 
though Downs’ thesis of an autonomic party is quite appealing. Party actions, we 
argue, are based on some level of autonomy but we believe that this power is 
limited. Structures working outside of a party are still of importance and are 
therefore included in our calculus. Also, within the structure of every party there 
are several forces competing against each other and the party elite must therefore, 
as we see it, compromise its political agenda in order to achieve its goals and, in 
the long run, survive (compare Przeworski & Sprague and Strom in Håkansson, 
2005:70ff).  
With these premises in mind a party is never fully free; it has to adapt to 
factors outside the party (i.e. economic, cultural and social) and within the party 
(compromises in the decision-making process). These viewpoints can be said to 
be influenced by (1) the structural position and (2) the organisational position. We 
do not reject these perspectives but to apply them would be rather unsatisfactory 
since this thesis’ intention is to reveal the motives behind party behaviour. If we 
would adopt the structural position we would find ourselves in a catch 22 situation 
since party behaviour within the structural approach is severely dependent on 
behaviour lying outside a party’s domain and it would therefore be rather difficult 
to locate the origins of the motives.  
Within the organisational approach, a party acts in line with its internal 
structures and rules and its main priority is survival, action is of less importance 
(Håkansson, 2005:63ff). We find this view rather deterministic and its main ideas 
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would stand in conflict with our stated purpose. We are interested in party action 
itself and the motives lying underneath so if we analysed this, using an 
organisational perspective, we would not be able to see the party as an actor with 
motives since the perspective regards internal structures and rules as deciding 
factors over actions. 
As noted in numerous analyses, the professionalism (see ch. 9) of political 
parties does in fact give us strong incentives to view party behaviour from our 
perspective. We believe that a successive professionalism promotes an elite in 
every party – compare with Michels theory of oligarchy (Michels, 1983) – which 
in turn allow for the elite to form policies and to act on a relatively free platform. 
This argument is supported by Przeworski & Sprague (1986) who described 
parties as “actors with elbow room, but they must regard institutional and 
structural relationships when deciding over goals, calculus, decisions and actions” 
(Håkansson, 2005:71). 
Our rational actor perspective suggests a somewhat free agent (compare ch. 5), 
and therefore we assume that parties act out of consciousness and must therefore 
have somewhat clear goals behind every action. We choose not to take any stand 
on what these particular goals may be and, according to our purpose, we do not 
intend to reveal the party’s ultimate goals. It is fully satisfactory to investigate the 
more specific motives in this specific situation. In the following section we 
describe three clearly defined motives that we are going to look for in the 
empirical analysis, since we can not rely solely on the motives stated by the 
Moderates (see ch. 4).  
3.2 Theoretical motives 
A motive is the considered intention an actor has to a specific action. We have 
made a distinction between strategic motives and preferential motives. The 
strategic motives are motives that can help the actor to achieve certain goals. 
Preferential motives on the other hand are the motives that are directly related to 
the actors’ preferences, they are goals in themselves (comp. Esaiasson et al, 
2005:322-323). Sjöblom (1968) have a theory that parties main goal is program 
realisation and that strategic motives exist at the same time; parties try to achieve 
their preferences by making strategic considerations. The motives presented 
below are strategic motives and are mainly derived from Sjöblom. Preferential 
motives are excluded here for two reasons. First, we can not specify all political 
preferential motives since there are too many. Second, parties expose their 
preferential motives much more willingly than their strategic motives and we will 
therefore be able to find preferential motives anyhow.   
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3.2.1 Vote-maximisation 
 
According to Håkansson, a party vote-maximises when ”as many voters as 
possible is to be won regardless of who they are and what politics the party 
traditionally enhance” (2005:81). In An Economic Theory of Democracy Downs 
argue: ”if everyone knew which type of ideology would win, all parties would 
adopt it” (Downs, 1957:101). 
According to Sjöblom, when a party vote-maximises it should ”act so that the 
party is given as many votes as possible at the general elections” This view is, on 
a fundamental level, in fact inclined with the other authors’ view on vote-
maximising. However, none of the authors provide a full and comprehensive view 
on the term in question. Still, a clear definition of the term is much needed since it 
will serve as our guiding light (see “Method”). We have therefore designed our 
own definition of the term vote-maximisation by fusing previous views on this 
particular term together. The definition is as follows: 
 
Vote-maximisation is when a political party consciously transforms its political 
agenda based on other factors than ideology and/or traditional platform in order 
to gain votes for the party’s ultimate goal(s) in question. 
3.2.2 Parliamentary influence 
Parliamentry influence, we argue, is quite different from sheer vote-maximisation. 
To act in order to achieve parliamentary influence “the party believes it can not 
obtain its own majority and should therefore calculate with the possibility of 
having to form a coalition with one or more of the other parties (Sjöblom, 
1968:79-80). Therefore, we adjust our vote-maximisation-definition above in 
order to obtain an independent definition of Parliamentary influence: 
 
Parliamentary influence is when a political party consciously transforms its 
political agenda in order to adjust to the other party or parties it wishes to 
collaborate with. 
3.2.3 Internal cohesion  
 
A motive that is less controversial is that of internal cohesion. It is reasonable to 
believe that cohesion smoothes the process of party efforts. Cohesion is a must for 
the party to persevere; if the members within show no bond nor understanding 
whatsoever one can assume that this particular group will not exist for much 
longer (Bäck & Möller, 2003:54).  
Sjöblom differentiates between three types of support within the party 
cohesion; opinion-support, vote-support and resource-support (Sjöblom, 1968:85). 
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In this thesis we base our term on the first two. The third is more focused on the 
party’s members and their will to contribute with financial and personnel means. 
This is of less interest since this thesis’ focus is placed on the elite’s motives 
behind a specific action and does not include all members. Sjöblom means that ”it 
seems fitting to relate ’party cohesion’ primarily to the content in the party’s 
output”. Therefore, the strive for party cohesion is: 
 
When a political party make decisions about standpoints, candidates and 
propaganda content in such a way as to ensure that the greatest possible unity 
can exist among the party members. 
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4 Method and Material 
The aim of this thesis is to find the motives behind the Moderates’ change after 
the new leadership took over in 2003. In this section we will explain how this will 
be done and what kind of material we will use.  
The method we have employed draws upon the motive analysis in the way it is 
portrayed by Hadenius (1984) and Esaiasson et al (2005). The method is rather 
similar to Hadenius’ suggestions but it is slightly different, especially in chapter 
(B) (see 4.2 and 7), which will become obvious when we describe the different 
parts below. The analysis consists of four parts which will be commented 
seperately since each part employs a particular method and a specific set of 
material: 
• (A) Stated motives by the actor 
• (B) Other actions by the actor 
• (C) Similar actions by other actors 
• (D) Similar actions by actors in general 
4.1 (A) Stated motives by the actor 
In chapter 6 we display the various motives we have found in our material and 
analyse the statements made in accordance to a scheme of analysis in order to find 
out what motive(s) they consider to be most important. The scheme of analysis is 
based on three different criteria’s:  
• Frequency – If a motive is repeated frequently we assume that it is 
of importance.  
• Stability – If a motive have persevered during a longer period of 
time it is more likely that this motive was important to the actor. The 
motive should be stated immediately after the action, or preferably 
before the action if it really was at hand. 
• Position – If a motive has a prominent position or is emphasised in 
some particular way it should be considered as more important.  
 
We do need to point out that the risks of arbitrary conclusions are quite 
substantive (see Esaiasson et al, 2005:331 and Hadenius, 1984:149). Still, as long 
as our criterions and conclusions are argued in a schematic manner and revealed 
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as openly as possible, we think (and hopefully so will the readers) that our future 
conclusions will be of a valid nature. 
In the material we will search for 1) the motive(s) stated by the Moderates 
themselves3 and 2) strategic motives derived from literature. Our established 
definitions of our different motives (see ch. 3.2) are used in order for us to locate 
these within the statements made by our actor in the material at hand. It is quite 
risky to depend only on our actors stated motives since we assume that actors, 
maybe specifically political actors, are not very likely keen on revealing the true 
motives if these involve strategic considerations and self-interest (Esaiasson et al, 
2005:320-321). Strategic motives defined in advance are therefore necessary. 
Still, we are open for other motives than the ones we have reviewed in the theory-
section since there is a possibility that the real motives are to be found outside of 
our theoretical framework.  
4.1.1 The process 
How then have we applied the method explained above? We have studied a large 
scope of material which includes: 
• TV and radio-interviews with our key actors in programs produced 
by Swedish National Television (SVT) and Swedish National Radio 
(SR), and therefore available on the net (svt.se, sr.se). Also, 
“Specials” dealing with the election 2006 and longer pieces dealing 
with special occasions such as “Almedalsveckan” are included. 
• Articles in Sweden’s four major newspapers4: Dagens Nyheter (DN), 
Svenska Dagbladet (SvD), Göteborgsposten (GP) and Sydsvenska 
Dagbladet5.  
• Medborgaren, the party’s own journal. 
 
The TV and radio material were found through searches on the web (sr.se and 
svt.se) and do probably not contain all interviews the actors have done since 
20036. However, a majority of their interviews in these channels are probably 
found and we do not consider the selection to be much of a problem since the 
actors should give voice to, by and large, the same motives in all interviews7.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 Statements made regarding the motives behind the action must come from at least one of the 
actors above (or be approved by them).  
4 By size of edition, excluding ”yellow papers” 
(www.dn.se/DNet/jsp/polopoly.ysp?d=602&a=493183 2007-03-22, 
www.citygate.se/network/main.asp 2007-03-22). 
5 No motives were found in Sydsvenska Dagbladet 
6 We have searched the TV and radio channels homepages. We have searched the actors’ names, 
the epithets “nya moderaterna” (“new Moderates”), “Sveriges nya arbetarparti” (“Sweden’s new 
labour party”) and “val 2006” (“election 2006”). 
7 A big number of cases aretherfore not particularly important. It soon becomes obvious which 
motives the actor consider important (or at least chose to reveal). 
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The interviews are un-edited and are therefore regarded as a first-hand source 
and as less problematical concerning tendency and proximity. It is not very likely 
that the journalists have had the chance to deceive the audience. The actors, 
however, can not be assumed to be totally honest wich we have discussed above 
regarding strategic motives (ch. 3.2).  
The newspaper-category is similar regarding the searches for material and the 
actors’ honesty. However, the possibility is that the articles could portray the 
actors’ statement in a less truthful way than the unedited interviews in TV and 
radio. It would then increase the tendency problem but we rely to great extent on 
the journalists in the major newspapers and we do therefore not consider it to be a 
problem. 
We have read every edition of the Moderates’ internal journal, Medborgaren, 
from the election 2002 to the election 2006. Anyone is free to get a subscription 
and it is therefore not likely that any confidential material would appear. Still, 
statements made by the actor for the internal arena should be classified as more 
reliable than statements made for the external arena (Hadenius 1980:164). 
Additionally, the statements are made close in time to the related change. 
However, we did not find any debates of the party’s strategies and policies in 
the journal which makes us believe that the journal is used more as a medium for 
convincing its readers. It should be regarded as a tendency-problem since different 
views of the party’s change existed in the Moderates but almost none of these 
were presented in the journal. The journal is still of importance since it is a first-
hand source.  
Some of the material discussed above involves statements of the Moderates 
change years after it started (see ch. 5.1). It could be a problem with proximity in 
time since ”the more time that goes by, the greater the risk for memory lapses, 
gradual rationalizations and the oppurtunity to let oneself be affected by what 
others said and wrote on the matter” (Hadenius, 1984:162). We show that we are 
aware of this in the discussion of the stability criterion. 
4.2 (B) Other actions by the actor 
In chapter 7 we will examine the actors’ political background to see if their 
previous beliefs and actions are similar to those expressed when the actors carried 
out the described change. By placing the actors’ previous actions and beliefs in 
relation to the studied change we will be able to see if the actors’ stated motives 
are reasonable and correspond to the action in question. This is especially 
important if the Moderates had any strategic motives (see ch. 3.2). If they did, it 
should become obvious when comparing actions and beliefs during a longer 
period of time. The most genuine motives we can possibly link to the actors are 
the ones they had before they knew they would become responsible for the 
renewal of the party. 
There is a lot of available material dealing with Fredrik Reinfeldt. Some of 
this material gives a little information about the other actors too; however, this 
  11 
information is rather limited. Our primary sources here are not scientific writings 
and the authors can sometimes be suspected to be tendentious. Stig-Björn 
Ljunggren is for example known to have socialistic views and it therefore 
reasonable to believe that he wants to portray the Moderates in a less positive 
way. However, we use the material to get facts and we try to avoid the authors 
own interpretations. Since we have more than one source to most of the described 
events we are able to diminish the problem of the authors’ tendency. This does 
also reduce the problem of proximity which can be said to occur when events in 
the first half of the 1990’s are described in second hand-sources. Even though 
Wiklund’s book (2006) must be regarded as a second-hand source, large parts of it 
seem to be Reinfeldt’s own description of his political career and the course of 
action when he took over the party leadership. 
Reinfeldt himself has also written two books of interest which reveals some of 
his earlier beliefs. The books are valuable since they are first-hand sources of 
Reinfeldt’s beliefs and should portray his views sincerely. However, Det sovande 
folket (1993) is much more critical to the welfare-state than Nostalgitrippen 
(1995)8. How this should be interpreted is discussed in chapter 7. 
4.3 (C) Similar actions by other actors 
In chapter 8, we will look for other actors within the political party-sphere who 
sought to implement a somewhat similar approach like the one by the Moderates. 
If the motives expressed by these actors are similar to our actors’ motives, we 
argue that the support for these particular motives increases.  
The “New” Democrats in the US and “New” Labour in the UK are good 
examples to portray for this purpose since they acted within a similar context and 
adjusted to this situation by stating a reform of their political agendas. In the 
search for the motives behind these two parties’ stated change we draw upon 
already reached conclusions. These can be found in various science-journals 
where the authors, mostly political scientists, discuss the action in order to 
understand why these changes took place. Obviously we cannot go through all of 
the material dealing with this matter. Therefore, we investigated some of the 
major and impartial journals9. We have chosen to use previous research in this 
case because we have neither time nor space to do independent studies of our 
analogy-examples. Our conclusions will be based on other scientists’ 
conclusions10. Also, the problem with the analogies is that even though the actions 
give the impression of being similar, the actors’ motives may be different. 
Therefore we need to value this chapter as less important than ch. 6 and 7. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
8 With co-writers Graner and Lindvall. 
9 In addition a book by Fairclough is used. This book is not considered to be impartial due certain 
seemingly subjective comments by the author. 
10 Not on our own interpretation like chapter 6 and 7. 
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4.4  (D) Similar actions by actors in general 
Chapter 9 bears some resemblance to the previous, but the focus is more on 
theories, both empirically tested and strictly hypothetical. By studying these we 
will find out how parties can act. This is important for our understanding of the 
Moderates transformation. If the generally accepted theories that we present 
correspond with our case it will strengthen our previous conclusions, especially if 
the theories are empirically tested. However, if all the general motives derived 
from the theories differ from the motives we have found with the Moderates, this 
will not necessarily undermine our conclusions, but it will certainly raise some 
doubts. 
The abstract theories tend to overlap with the discussion in our theoretical 
motives-section and therefore we do not repeat the definitions and discussions of 
strategic motives (see ch. 3.2). However, we broaden the discussion of vote-
maximisation extensively. 
Håkansson (2005) reviews empirical research of Swedish parties in addition to 
his assessment of more abstract theories. These studies are less problematical 
from a proximity perspective since they deal with Swedish conditions. Also, 
tendency should not be much of a problem since Håkansson seems to have an 
intersubjective approach and expose his material and ideas openly.  
We have relied rather heavily on Håkansson’s review of empirical studies 
since we do not have time to review all existing studies. However, we have 
examined a lot of the existing party theories, often in original texts (i.e. primary 
sources)11. 
4.5 Drawing conclusions 
 
The first step in order to be able to reveal the Moderates’ motives behind their 
change is to clearly describe which individuals we consider as responsible for the 
change, i.e. the actor. This is done in 5.1. We also have to make clear what 
constitutes the Moderates’ stated change so the reader knows exactly what action 
we try to explain. The action is described in chapter 5.2 and consists of several 
components12. We have also used additional facts regarding the change and the 
actors’ views of the change in our analysis of each chapter. These are drawn 
mainly from interviews in Wiklund (2006) and our own interviews with the 
former head of communication Per Schlingmann (currently party secretary) and 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
11 However, not many of the works are mentioned in the thesis since it was not useful enough. 
12 We argue that these components are so tightly connected that they must correspond to the same 
motives (compare Hadenius, 1980:168-170). 
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former parliamentary member and “new Moderates”-critic Patrik Norinder. 
Norinder’s views help us contrast the actors’ motives; if strategic motives were at 
hand (see below) he would probably reveal them more openly than the actors. He 
had insight in the Moderate party’s decision process since he worked in the 
parliament and was active in the Moderates, for example through the party’s 
conferences. Since he is very critical to the Moderates change we presume that he 
may perhaps overstate the power of the party elite and ascribe them motives they 
did not have.  
A problem, which we have not been able to evade in any part of the thesis, is 
that strategic motives seldom are revealed officially by the the actors. Since we 
have not been able to listen to the main actors’ internal discussions there is a 
chance that the actors consciously conceal strategic motives. This tendency 
problem is somewhat avoided by letting our investigation-chapters (see ch. 6-9) 
function as a complement to each other. Together, we argue, they provide an 
understanding of what motives the party actually had when stating its change. For 
example, if one chapter is in favour of motive X and the following chapter is 
aswell, we argue that the value of motive X has increased. However, had the 
following chapter favoured another motive, by contrast, the value of motive X 
would have decreased. It is important to point out that we regard section A and B 
as most important since these are based on our own study. Section C and D can 
not reveal the Moderates’ motives in themselves. Still, as we mentioned, they can 
certainly strengthen prior conclusions. 
The conclusion of the motives total support will be done in the chapter 10 and 
it will be based on each of our four investigation-chapters. The motives are 
examined separately here but we discuss their relevance in comparison to each 
other too. 
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5 Action and actor 
5.1 The Action  
We have pointed out before that we are interested in the “New Moderates” and the 
change they claimed to have done. Also, we want to know what the Moderates 
meant when they argued they were “new” and “Sweden’s new labour party”. This 
is essential to our analysis because of the way in which the party changed can be 
related to certain motives.  
    The ”New Moderates” was presented at the Moderates’ party conference in 
2005. The concept was created by Per Schlingmann, head of communication at 
that time (“Hjärngänget”, 2006-09-18). Schlingmann said that the Moderates tried 
to emphasise and almost exaggregate their political change in order to make it 
clear for people that the party had made an actual change (Schlingmann, 2007-02-
14).  
The year before, 2004, Reinfeldt held a speech before the celebration of the 
100 year anniversary of the moderate party, in which the epithet “Sweden’s new 
labour party” was introduced (“Hjärngänget”, 2006-09-18). Even though the 
concept was used in a somewhat different way than their main political 
antagonists, the Social Democratic Labour Party, the label labour party could be 
interpreted as a way of changing the party’s image. The change can be understood 
as a change to a softer image that was friendlier to the welfare state. This can be 
compared to the image of a harsh tax-reducing party that existed before. This 
change is manifested in the article, “Vi lägger om vår politik” in Dagens Nyheter 
(2004-03-04), where party leader Fredrik Reinfeldt, together with Anders Borg 
and Mikael Odenberg, admits that the Moderates earlier tax-reducing proposals 
were unfair and that they would have gained the wealthiest persons in society.   
However, the change towards this renewal of the party started earlier. Already 
before Reinfeldt took over he wrote, together with Borg and Littorin, an activity 
plan that outlined a new path for the Moderates (Wiklund, 2006:90-92). But it was 
after the election committee’s unanimous decision to recommend Fredrik 
Reinfeldt as party leader that the new direction became clear. This happened early 
summer 2003 and we consider this to be the first component of the Moderates 
transformation. The people behind this change are presented more thoroughly 
below. 
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5.2 The Actor 
In our problem-chapter above (ch. 2.1) we stated that it is necessary to define the 
actor involved in order to achieve a comprehensive picture of the action itself and 
the specific motive(s) behind it.  
Party leader Fredrik Reinfeldt is the key player since he was elected in order to 
recover the party. The other actors can not be derived from their official positions 
within the party. However, we have been able to locate the central actors based on 
the course of events that followed the resignation of Bo Lundgren. These have 
been further confirmed in our interviews and in several articles in newspapers.  
Sven-Otto Littorin and Anders Borg were both personally appointed to the 
Moderates after the party’s harsh defeat in the 2002 election. Littorin was 
appointed as party secretary and Borg as the head of the party’s parliament 
council. Before Lundgren resignated, Reinfeldt, Borg and Littorin together 
analysed the Moderates situation and in which direction they wanted to take the 
party. They cooperated closely after Lundgrens resignation too and together 
planned a reform of the Moderates (Ljunggren, 2006:162; Wiklund, 2006:90-92, 
145-147, 167 and “Reinfeldts "sväng" får stöd. Revanschsugna moderater 
applåderar den nya skattepolitiken”,  2004-03-13).  
Per Schlingmann, former head of communications within the Moderates, was 
according to Reinfeldt ”the main architect behind the Moderates’ renewal”, the 
inventor of the concept of ”Sweden’s new labour party” and the leader of the 
party’s propaganda approach (”Moderaterna byter partisekreterare”, SvD, 
“Hjärngänget” 2006-09-18; ”PR-snillet bakom m-omgörningen”, SvD, 2006-09-
28; 2005-09-28; “Slaget om väljarna”, DN, 2005-10-08). He was certainly the 
most influential person regarding the communication of the new political 
direction. 
Per Schlingmann and Patrik Norinder agree regarding the central actors even 
though Schlingmann add that everyone in the party committee has influence on 
the party’s actions (Schlingmann, 2007-02-14 and Norinder, 2007-03-27).  
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6 A: Stated motives by the actor 
In this chapter the Moderates stated motives are examined. The material we have 
used is described and evaluated in the Method (ch. 4.1). The material was 
assessed with a scheme of analysis and the results are presented in tables (see 
Appendix 11.1 – 11.3). The results are first presented separately and then 
compared in the analysis. We soon found that the Moderates had motives in 
addition to the ones defined in advance. These were easily placed in two 
categories. When a statement referred to changes in society we labelled this 
particular statement as a societal change-motive. When a statement referred to a 
wish to make their policies more viable we labelled the statement as a viability-
motive. 
6.1 Findings: TV and Radio 
The motives declared by the party in TV/Radio (see Appendix 11.1), are clearly in 
favour of the vote-maximisation-strategy. Reinfeldt repeatedly expressed how the 
Moderates new approach is designed to attract all voters. For example: 
”Everybody can vote for the New Moderates. I think it is very important to use 
that approach” (SVT, 2006-03-09). This coincides with our definition of vote-
maximisation displayed above. Furthermore, Reinfeldt do mention both viability 
and societal change as motives behind the change yet he does not give these any 
prominent position. Not only are they less frequently expressed than the vote-
maximisation motive but they are also less emphasised and often positioned in the 
background of the various utterances. Internal cohesion is mentioned once, very 
subtle and discret, which leads us to remove this motive from our conclusion. 
Parliamentary influence is not mentioned at all. 
6.2 Findings: Newspapers 
The results in the newspaper-category (see Appendix 11.2) are quite complex and 
we must therefore lean on our own interpretations and common sense in order to 
be able to draw any conclusions. The frequency criterion suggests that societal 
change is the dominant motive. However, the stability criterion indicates the 
viability factor as the prominent motive. Considering how the emphasis on the 
societal change motive was expressed we are led to believe that, with the 
frequency criterion included, this particular motive is in fact the dominant force. 
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Reinfeldt is clearly in favour of this: ”Sweden has changed and we have changed 
in order to solve the problems of our time” (“Moderaterna plagierar sossarnas 
affisch”, GP, 2006-03-18). Although more stable than the societal change motive, 
the viability motive was expressed in a more discret manner. In other words, 
instead of clearly stating viability as a motive behind the change, as Reinfeldt did 
in the quote above, we base our viability findings on our own interpretation. We 
believe that this is a strong argument for a less dominant role of viability. In 
contrast to the TV/radio findings, there is little in favour of the vote-maximisation 
approach. There were no findings that expressed an indication of parliamentary 
influence or internal cohesion. 
6.3 Findings: Medborgaren 
The result of the findings in Medborgaren is presented in the Appendix 11.3. It 
shows that societal change and viability are the most frequently stated motives by 
the Moderates. They are followed by vote-maximisation, which was linked once 
to viability.  
Viability was mentioned twice in 2003, after Reinfeldt took over the 
leadership. Since these motives were mentioned again in 2005 and 2006 they must 
be considered as stable. Societal change, however, was only mentioned during 
2005 and 2006 and can not be said to be stable. In fact we must pose the question: 
is societal change an explanation invented after the change?  
The motives’ position in the text is somewhat different but not enough to 
change the status of the motives. Vote-maximisation were mentioned more subtle 
then the other motives which can be explained by the fact that it is a strategical 
motive that actors often try to hide, which we have mentioned above. Frequency 
must therefore be considered as the decisive category even though the stability is 
a reason to emphasise the importance of viability and vote-maximisation 
compared with the other motives.  
Internal cohesion appears only once and it should perhaps be understood as an 
explanation of how the change was supposed to take place, rather than as a goal in 
itself.   
6.4 Analysis 
Viability and societal change are the most frequently stated motives in all 
categories except in the TV/radio-category where vote-maximisation was the most 
frequent. The motives’ stability and position in the texts and other presentations 
differ somewhat but it does not affect the mentioned motives’ prominent 
positions. The support for both viability and societal change is very substantive. 
The motives are further strengthened with explanations by the actors. An 
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implication to the viability motive is that the Moderates former policies not were 
considered as viable by the actors. This is confirmed for example with Anders 
Borg’s views of the Moderates budget proposal in 1999 (Wiklund, 2006:145-152). 
An implication to the societal change motive is that the actors believed that the 
society actually changed. Per Schlingmann argue that the main problem in 
Sweden 10-20 years ago was lack of productivity. The Moderates tried to solve 
this problem with tax policies. Today the main problem is that a lot of people are 
outside of the labour market and the focus is therefore to solve this problem 
(Schlingmann, 2007-02-14). 
Vote-maximisation did in fact receive relatively strong support. We believe 
that one reason for its frequency in the TV/radio-category is that the actors are 
aware of how important this medium is for attracting the large scope of voters 
(compared to Medborgaren for example). They are therefore inclined to express 
themselves in more sensitive manners, particularly emphasizing their own 
agendas’ functionality with the puplic opinion, which is interpreted as vote-
maximisation. 
However, considering the controversial nature of vote-maximisation it is not 
likely to be openly revealed by the Moderates. If, for example, a party existed 
solely for the sake of reaching power they certainly would not state this since it 
goes against the society’s norms and conventions. We cannot, therefore, receive a 
total support for this particular motive in this chapter even though chances are that 
this motive was in fact the dominant feature behind the Moderates’ change.  
The two remaining motives, internal cohesion and parliamentary influence, 
did not receive any significant support. Internal cohesion was mentioned once in 
both Medborgaren and the TV/radio-category, yet one occasion is, we argue, too 
irregular to be of any value.  
6.5 Conclusion 
Viability and societal change received strong support. They are the most 
important motives according to the actors own statements. They were further 
supported by confirming the implications that follows of the motives. 
Vote-maximisation got fair support, which is more than expected, considering 
that it is a strategic motive. Other motives did not receive any significant support. 
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7 B: Other actions by the actor 
Per Schlingmann argued in our interview that the new leadership in 2003 
evaluated the Moderate’s policies independent from the earlier leadership 
(Schlingmann, 2007-02-14). The implication that follows is that our actors had a 
vision of a change before they got the decisive power. In the following section we 
examine the actors’ political views in the past. Reinfeldt’s history will be 
examined separately since we maintain that he is the most important person 
behind the change. 
7.1 Fredrik Reinfeldt      
What exactly were Reinfeldt’s views in the past? Hints are given in his early 
writings, for example in Det sovande folket (1993) which presents ideas that differ 
heavily from the actions of the “New Moderates”. In this book Reinfeldt attacked 
the welfare state and advocated the idea that the voters are not always right. 
Reinfeldt argued that the voters must “understand that they also have to change in 
order for the civil society to function” (Ljunggren, 2006:96). He also declared that 
“[w]e do not want a society where people are starving, but no other standard 
demands should be financed with taxes” (Ljunggren, 2006:97). Several years later 
after he had become the leader of the “New Moderates”, Reinfeldt declared that 
the book was written to please his critics in the Moderates’ youth organisation, 
MUF. He wanted to promote internal cohesion in the organisation and admits that 
he exaggerated his critic of the welfare state. The critics had accused Reinfeldt of 
being a political coward who embraced the welfare state (Ljunggren, 2006:93-104 
and Wiklund, 2006:51-52).  
Reinfeldt’s take on the welfare state relate to the episode around 1990 when 
two fractions struggled for power in the Moderates youth organisation, MUF. 
Reinfeldt lead the conservative fraction and Ulf Kristoffersson the neo-liberal 
fraction. Reinfeldt’s conservative beliefs made it impossible for him to accept the 
radical suggestions from the neo-liberals about eliminating the welfare state. Even 
if he wanted to reduce the welfare state, unlike the Social democrats, he wanted 
such a reduction to be performed slowly (Wiklund, 2006:35ff).  
Reinfeldt published Nostalgitrippen in 199513. The book was critical to several 
parts of the Moderate’s features. Reinfeldt felt that the party under Bildt placed 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
13 With co-writers Magnus G. Graner and Martin Lindvall. 
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too little focus on people’s everyday life. Reinfeldt has, as the leader of the 
Moderates, worked hard to incorporate this particular view into the party’s 
political agenda (Ljunggren, 2006:13-15). Reinfeldt also criticised Carl Bildt, 
party leader at the time, in an interview. Reinfeldt claimed that Bildt spoke of the 
politics as a system which required a s single solution, “[h]owever, the new 
generation of individualists does not want one single solution” (“Ung kritik mot 
Bildt”, SvD, 1995-01-28).  
Another belief of Reinfeldt was that the Moderates had to formulate policies 
regarding, for example, environmental and social issues since this did not exist in 
the moderate policies at the time. In Nostalgitrippen this was presented as a 
proposed strategy for the election in 1998 together with the idea that the party 
should acquire less conformistic representatives (i.e. white, middle-aged males 
with similar views) (Ljunggren, 2006:107 and Reinfeldt et al 1995:135-145). 
Reinfeldt’s views, presented in Nostalgitrippen and in interviews, were 
strongly disliked in the party’s leadership, especially by party leader Carl Bildt. 
Reinfeldt was called to a meeting were he, in front of the parliamentary group14, 
was condemned by the leadership (Ljunggren, 2006:107-108 and Wiklund 2006: 
64-65). 
Reinfeldt argued the same year that the party dealt with the welfare debate in 
the wrong way. Reinfeldt argued that the party has to decrease people’s worries 
about changes and show exactly how proposed tax reductions shall be financed, 
i.e. prove them as viable (”M måste visa att det bryr sig om människor:[…]”, 
SvD, 11/11-1995).  
7.2 Anders Borg, Sven-Otto Littorin and Per 
Schlingmann 
The other main actors behind the Moderates’ change have had opinions that 
differed from Reinfeldt’s. Fria moderata studentförbundet (“Unbound moderate 
student association”), FMSF, was a network with rather radical neo-liberals, 
loosely connected with the Moderates (Ljunggren, 2006:137). Anders Borg was 
vice president of FMSF during 1990-91 and he was also a speech-writer for Carl 
Bildt during his time as the party leader. However, that does not mean that he 
always agreed with the Moderates. In 1999 he found that the party’s budget-
proposal was wrongfully constructed and too critical of the labour laws. Today he 
describes himself as social-liberal and pragmatic, compared to his earlier neo-
liberal views (Wiklund, 2006:145-152). 
Sven-Otto Littorin was, as we mentioned before, party secretary before 
Reinfeldt took over and he worked for the Moderates when Carl Bildt was the 
leader. Littorin and several others left the party and took other jobs the period 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
14 The parliament group is everyone representing the Moderates in the parliament. 
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after Bildt’s resignation as a consequence of the party’s diminutive acceptance for 
new ideas. When Littorin was asked to become party secretary in 2002 he 
demanded that Anders Borg would join him, which makes it reasonable to believe 
that he had political views that were similar to Borg’s (Wiklund, 2006:165-167).  
Per Schlingmann was appointed by the Moderates as head of communication 
after Reinfeldt became party leader. He met Reinfeldt during their time in the 
Moderates youth organisation, MUF. When Schlingmann left his position as press 
secretary in MUF in 1995 he started working with communication in the private 
sector. When he came back to the Moderates his first reaction was that there was a 
lack of devotion to the voters’ opinions. Schlingmann and Reinfeldt met several 
times after their time in MUF and both felt that the Moderates were in need of 
reforms. They wanted to make the Moderates policies more connected to people’s 
everyday life in addition to their idea of an improved communication and 
developed media strategy (Wiklund, 2006:160). 
7.3 Analysis 
Reinfeldt has had, as explained above, the same political views during his whole 
political career. The actual motives behind these views are harder to find. There is 
a possibility that he in fact made strategic considerations all along. In the final 
chapter in Nostalgitrippen (1995) Reinfeldt and co-writers present strategic 
advises for the party concerning the issue on how to attract voters. This is not 
necessarily a case of vote-maximisation since the particular suggestions presented 
did not stand in conflict with the party’s policies. However, the expansion of the 
party’s policies would imply a change of the Moderates’ traditional agenda that 
match our vote-maximisation definition. 
At the same time much of Reinfeldt’s critique was based on his conservative 
beliefs and his opinion that the Moderates had forgot about their conservative 
heritage. This is confirmed by Nilsson (2004) who regards the Moderate’s period 
with Bildt and Lundgren as a parenthesis from a historical perspective (2004:237). 
Reinfeldt’s strategical proposals in Nostalgitrippen (1995) correspond very 
well with his subsequent actions since he has included environmental and welfare 
issues in the Moderates policies. Moreover, the idea that it is necessary to clearly 
show how reduced taxes shall be financed, i.e. viability (presented in “M måste 
visa att det bryr sig om människor:[…]”, SvD, 1995-11-11), correspond 
completely with the article,“Vi lägger om vår politik“ in which Reinfeldt argued, 
together with Mikael Odenberg and Anders Borg, that the Moderates’ previous 
tax reduction-proposals were unfair and not viable (“Vi lägger om vår politik”, 
DN, 2004-03-04). 
 Internal cohesion was probably a motive for Reinfeldt when he, as it seems, 
tried to unite the Moderates’ youth organisation, MUF. However, later on he 
provoked Bildt and the Moderate party when he was a member of the parliament. 
Reinfeldt and the other actors challenged the Moderates’ organisation when they 
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transformed the party (Schlingmann, 2007-02-14) so the correspondence between 
the different actions is not very extensive. 
The other actors’ views might not have been that consistent. Littorin and Borg 
were loyal to the previous leaderships, both under Carl Bildt and Bo Lundgren. 
This can be contrasted with Reinfeldt who criticised Bildt heavily. Borg was also 
a rather radical neo-liberal when he was younger. However, Borg has declared 
that he has become more social-liberal. This change of opinion should not be 
regarded as a strategic move since the first signs of this change came before he 
knew the party would perform poorly in the election 2002 (Wiklund, 2006:145-
152). 
7.4 Conclusion 
The major conclusion in this chapter is that Reinfeldt has had similar beliefs from 
the beginning of his political career. This indicates that the Moderates’ sudden 
transformation after he became party leader was not done in order to vote-
maximise. Still, there are some indications that Reinfeldt have had vote-
maximisation as a motive during a long period of time. Therefore we consider this 
chapter to give a fair support for vote-maximisation. 
Viability got strong support since it was a significant correspondence between 
Reinfeldts’ earlier actions and the Moderates’ change when he became party 
leader.  
Internal cohesion got some support but it is unambiguous. Therefore we 
consider the support weak. 
Societal change and parliamentary influence were not supported at all. 
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8 C: Similar actions performed by 
similar actors 
As mentioned in our method-chapter (4.3), this is the section where we will 
investigate other political parties’ similar transformations. We use the New 
Democrats (U.S) and New Labour (G.B.) as analogy-examples in order to find out 
what motive(s) they had behind these particular declarations of change. The 
results can further strengthen our conclusions regarding the Moderates’ motives 
behind their described change. Remember that we base our conclusions on other 
authors’ conclusions. Their findings are not generally acknowledged and are 
based on their very own interpretations so, therefore we argue, our conclusions are 
of relevance, yet they must be looked at with a rather critical eye. 
8.1 The (New) Democrats 
”A significant electoral defeat provides the occasion for rethinking a party's 
message”, writes Jon F. Hale (1995). The author is referring to the Democrats loss 
in the 1980 election; an election which came to be known as the worst disaster for 
the party since the 1930:s. The election in 1984 changed little as the Republicans 
tightened their seat in the White House. The party was in need of change and in 
1985 the Democrats launched the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) with the 
aim ”to reconstruct the identity of the national party to make it more appealing to 
mainstream voters who had been deserting the party in recent elections” (ibid.). 
However, the first years proved to be quite unsuccessful for the DLC and the 
Democrats faced another defeat in the 1988 election. It was argued that their 
nominee Dukakis ”never articulated an alternative vision for the country” (ibid.). 
The party decided to delegate more power to the DLC and transform it into a clear 
”idea-based movement focused on shaping a specific mainstream alternative 
identity for the party” (ibid.). This task was supported by the soon to be president 
Clinton who wanted a course everybody could support. This was the beginning of 
the New Democrats. 
As the DLC got an institutionalized role within the party, the organisation 
worked for ways in promoting the national Democratic party as the centred 
alternative. The election of 1988 was lost, they said, due the party’s lack of 
identity and was seen by the voters as ”liberal fundamentalism”, a term associated 
”with tax and spend policies that contradict the interests of average families; […] 
with ambivalence toward the assertion of American values and interests abroad; 
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and with an adversarial stance toward mainstream moral and cultural values” 
(ibid.). 
This perception drove many traditional Democrats to vote for the firmer 
alternative, the Republicans. Well aware of this, the Democrats had to moderate 
their presumably liberal rhetoric in order to gain the upper hand. They replaced 
the term liberal with the less controversial term progressive when identifying the 
party’s position (Hale, 1995:207-233). The New Democrats was now a party with 
a centred rhetoric, yet its content was in large parts still of the traditional liberal 
kind. Author Robert L. Borosage writes that ”[the party] contrasts its ’New 
Democrats’ agenda with that of the conservative Republicans on the one hand and 
that of the old, failed, liberal Democrats on the other. Yet its program often belie 
its rhetoric” (Borosage, 1993:148-150). This view was shared by Miller and 
Salholz: ”Instead of one all-encompassing vision, there will be two” (Salholz & 
Miller, 1993:19-20). Clinton, they continue, wanted ”to create a government that 
looks like the rest of America”, a reform they refer to as ”non-ideological” (ibid). 
Clinton himself underscored this when he announced his entry into the 
presidential campaign: ”The change I seek and the change that we must all seek, 
isn't liberal or conservative. It's different and it's both” (Hale, 1995). 
8.2 The (New) Labour Party 
When analysing the Labour party’s reformation, author John Gray concludes, ”the 
near-destruction of the Conservative Party by Margaret Thatcher was the single 
most important condition of New Labour’s rise to power” (Gray, 2005:40 and 
Smith, 2005:586). After over a decade of Thatcherian rule, the internal break-up 
within the Conservative Party made it possible for the rival Labour Party to seize 
its long-awaited governmental seat. However, during the Thatcher-era, the 
government had thrived as a non-socialist party and uttered an almost hostile 
approach towards collectivism and the Labour Party in general, a view 
successfully launched upon its citizens. But as the voters’ support for the Tories 
dropped, the Labour Party, with Tony Blair upfront, launched in 1995 what was to 
be known as the New Labour Party, after successfully withdrawing its free-market 
critique and the abolishment of ”tax and spend”-policies (Gray, 2005:41-42 and 
Smith, 2003:586-587). A quite radical reform considering the party’s original, 
more radical, socialistic platform: Even Thatcher asked: ”Is he one of us?” (Smith, 
2003:587). Blair wanted to modernise the party which is why he removed Clause 
Four from the party’s constitution15, a clause that used to stand as a symbol for 
Labour’s tax and union-friendly policies and its critical stance on the free-market. 
So what particular motives did the party have when adjusting its traditional 
platform?  
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In their analysis, political scientists Hills and Waldfogel argues that Labours’ 
adopted agenda ”was consistent with public attitudes and voter preferences” (Hills 
& Waldfogel, 2004:767). The party’s approach, according to the authors, relied 
more on ”what works?” than on a clear ideological position. This strategy, 
however, was not outspokenly confessed by the Labour Party istelf. The party was 
more inclined to point to external factors and Blair frequently mentioned this, 
more specifically by pointing to an expanding internationalism: ”In the 
increasingly global economy of today, we cannot compete in the old way” 
(Fairclough, 2005:22). A ”reinvention of government” (ibid. 67) was to be 
expected, performed by the help of ”new politics” (ibid. 21). For example, the 
rather controversial reduction of the party’s constitution, as mentioned above, was 
also a consequence with external factors, namely to change in order to adapt to the 
Tory-policies implemented during the Thatcherian years: ”The pervasive 
influence of neo-liberal ideas in the 1990s shaped The New Labour world-view”, 
Gray writes (Gray, 2005:42). He proceeds: “Blair was responding to the logic of 
the situation” (ibid. 44). Political scientist Trevor Smith concurs. The goal “was to 
set the nation in course better suited to the new millennium” (Smith, 2005:586). 
8.3 Analysis 
The reforms developed by the Democrats and Labour are quite similar and are 
developed in an almost identical context. As noted above, their opponents’ 
lengthy stronghold of power frustrated both parties. When comparing the two and 
their reforms, authors Cambell and Rockman concurs: ”These conditions of 
lengthy political exile from executive power provided political opportunities for 
both Blair and Clinton that would have been inconceivable without their parties’ 
desperation to win office” (Cambell & Rockman, 2001:37). The Moderates were 
in a similar situation prior to the election 2006. Not only had the Moderates been 
out of executive strength for twelve years, their defeat in the 2002 election was 
surely a major warning sign saying that some reforms were necessary. 
As mentioned above, the Democrats defeat in the 1980 election was the worst 
in over forty years. The Labour party, prior to Blair, had suffered great losses as 
well. Thatcher, and later on John Major, had convinced UK citizens of Labours 
socialistic ties during Tory’s 18 years of reign. As a consequence there was a 
general scepticism towards socialism during the neo-liberal waves of the 1980s 
and the early 1990s. The neo-liberal forefront figure and Tory advisor F.A. Hayek 
marked this sign of the times whilst stating that “Labour will never win again”, 
indicating liberalism’s victory over socialism: A statement that might have been 
true had Blair not adjusted its policies to the winds of neo-liberalism.  
Not only did the context by which the two parties work within share similar 
features, the different parties surely developed a similar approach in order to 
tackle its problems. The most striking similarity is Blair’s and Clintons’ fortifying 
of viability and societal change as motives behind their policy changes. Blairs’ 
modernisation and Clintons project “to end welfare as we know it” was the result, 
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as Sbragia points out, “of a world in which the role of the state has changed 
emphasis from the welfare projects of the post-war period to the wealth creation 
functions of the present era” (Sbragia, 2000). These values were not traditional 
leftist and a reform was therefore a necessity in order to cope with this general 
change of view.  
The Moderates adopted a similar approach with focus on viability and societal 
change. For example, they concentrated on Sweden’s unemployment rates and job 
solutions in their election campaign (Broberg et al, 2007:3, Nuder, Tiden, nr. 1 
2007). According to various party analyses, the lack of focus on these specific 
matters was the main reason why the Social Democrats lost their power. In the 
Moderates’ analysis of their 2006 election, they claim “the issue regarding work 
and alienation was the election’s main issue, which united a critique of society 
shared by the voters and increased the trust for the Moderates” (Broberg et al, 
2007:3). The Moderates have evidently been inspired by at least Labours 
transformation to “New” Labour. Anders Borg declares, “it is obvious that we 
have had a lot to learn from them” (“Borg och Brown nytt radarpar”, DN, 2007-
02-08). Reinfeldt concurs. After visiting 10 Downing Street he said that “[i]n a 
way he [Blair] is a role model. A lot of the most important measurements required 
for party renewal were performed by Blair from his starting point, and I have done 
the same thing with the Moderates” (“Tony Blair Reinfeldts förebild”, DN, 2007-
03-07).  
Vote-maximisation, which received support in our earlier analysis, is not well-
documented in the conclusions we have gone through investigating New Labour 
and New Democrats. Still, one can interpret actions adopted by Clinton and Blair 
implemented for the sake of vote-maximisation. Hills and Waldfogel seem to 
suggest this when describing Labours’ new agenda as similar to the voters’ 
preferences. Clintons “non-ideological” approach can be interpreted in a similar 
way.  
Sociologist Norman Fairclough developed the theory of “The Third Way” 
whilst analysing Blairs’ Labour party. Parties who adopt to “The Third Way”  
disregard their true ideological origins; they “share a fascination for opinion polls 
and a new media characterized as ‘infotainment’” (Needham, 2005:343). What the 
citation suggests is that the approach, “The Third Way”, requires a tough media 
campaign. Smith declares that “Blair’s closest advisers were clearly aware of the 
power now wielded by the media: the campaign was devised with this very much 
in mind” (Smith, 2005:586). Clinton, in a similar manner, ”laid out moderate 
positions on […] threshold issues, but their substance was not as important as the 
image they projected” (Hale, 1995). The Moderates applied a similar approach. 
“The Moderates will become the best party in Sweden regarding voter contact and 
campaign methods”, declared Per Schlingmann for example (“Högerspöke ska 
helt tvättas bort”, SvD, 2006-09-29). According to him, the Moderates overstated 
their change for the purpose of making it apparent for people (Schlingmann, 
2007-02-14).  
Internal cohesion received, like our analysis of the Moderates behaviour, no 
support.  
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8.4 Conclusion 
We are able to conclude that the Democrats’ and Labours’ changes are similar to 
the Moderates change. It is therefore likely that the Moderates’ motives are rather 
similar to those found in our analogy-examples. 
Both societal change and viability got strong support primarily because these 
motives were frequently stated by both Clinton and Blair. 
Parliamentary influence was not found as a motive in this chapter either. 
However, this is usually less important motive in the plurality election systems in 
US and Great Brittain since less co-operation between parties is required 
(Sjöblom, 1968:?).  
Internal cohesion got no support. 
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9 D: Actions by actors in general 
In this chapter the Moderates’ change is compared with how parties can act 
according to relevant theories. We have already argued why we have restricted 
ourselves to the rational actor-perspective (see ch. 3.1). Therefore, in this chapter, 
we focus on theories within the rational actor-field. We have already described 
some strategic motives (see ch. 3.2) that are assumed to expose how parties act in 
general. We will focus on these and, in addition, studies that give empirical 
support for theories, mainly from Håkansson’s review.  
9.1 Party action in theory 
Within the rational actor-perspective there are several suggestions from various 
scholars of what parties basic goals are. Downs (1957:4ff) argued that everyone 
engaged in party activity are driven by self-interests. The motive behind actions is 
therefore to get power and money. This is done by forming a program that can get 
the most possible votes, i.e. vote-maximisation (Håkansson, 2005:68-70). In order 
for a party to be able to vote-maximise, it has to be ruled by a party elite. If so, the 
members influence has certainly decreased. Traditionally, parties have relied 
heavily on its members. Duverger described this type of parties as mass-parties 
(1963:427).  
Kirchheimer (1966) challenged the view of parties as mass-parties. He noticed 
that some parties had evolved into professional machines focusing less on 
ideology and membership and more on political leadership, vote maximizing and 
interest groups. He used the term catch-all party to describe this new kind of 
party. This implies that the role of the single party member becomes weaker and 
that the elite become stronger (Håkansson, 2005:72-73).  
Przeworski (1985) and Przeworski – Sprague (1986) developed the theory of 
vote-maximisation even further by studying western Social Democratic parties. 
They presented three problems which the party elites face when they try to 
maximise their votes. First, they have to convince the party organisation of the 
necessity of a change of program. Second, the group of voters that traditionally do 
not vote for the party has to become aware of the change and appreciate it to the 
degree that they are no longer reluctant to vote for the party. Third, and most 
important, the party has to keep most of their traditional voters (Håkansson 
2005:70-72). Przeworski and Sprague can therefore be said to regard the party as 
an actor that has to take into account the surrounding institutional and structural 
circumstances when they act (as we argued in ch. 3.1). 
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Håkansson (2005) looks for empirical support for the theories: does Swedish 
parties vote-maximise? The question is difficult to answer since it is hard to 
compare and evaluate the importance of various studies with somewhat different 
results. For example, Bäck and Möller (2003) argues that the existing parties in 
Sweden should still be regarded as massparties, despite several factors indicating 
an evolving volatility in Swedish politics, i.e. diminishing membership figures 
and voting participation and an increase of pro-politicians within each party (Bäck 
& Möller, 2003:99ff). Nonetheless, Håkansson finds several results that confirm 
the theories of vote-maximisation. Håkansson recognises the development of vote-
maximising elites during the last decades, especially among the Christian 
democrats, Social democrats and the Liberals (“Folkpartiet”) (Håkansson, 
2005:86-93).  
The Moderates, on the other hand, developed in an opposite direction from the 
1970’s and onward. They became ideologically convinced with a consequent 
political program. Instead of adapting to the voters opinion, the Moderates tried to 
convince the voters that their program was superior. However, the election 2002 
was disastrous for the Moderates and, as we have argued in this thesis, the 
Moderates changed significantly with the new leadership the year after 
(Håkansson, 2005:92-94). Håkansson recognises this16 and writes that the change 
appears to be “a typical example of what the rationalistic actor-theory predicts 
concerning party action” (2005:93). This implies that the Moderates should have 
increased their focus on vote-maximisation. 
Håkansson explains that crisis, for example connected to severe election-
failures, can reinforce a transformation of a party since both the leadership and the 
organisation can become more willing to accept a strategy more focused on vote-
maximising. Furthermore, the loss of members makes the party elite more 
powerful and free to act as they please (Håkansson, 2005:100).  
9.2 Analysis 
By studying the literature we have described how parties in general can act. 
Below, we will link the mentioned theories to the Moderates change in order to 
see if we can strengthen our previous conclusions. 
Vote-maximisation is the most frequently investigated motive in the literature 
(Håkansson, 2005:70-100). According to Patrik Norinder17, the Moderates 
changed because they believed the new stated policy would maximise their share 
of the votes (Norinder, 2007-03-26). The central actors have stated that they 
wanted to transform the Moderates into a party everyone could vote on (see for 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
16 He does so in a foot-note. The Moderates change did probably occur too recent to be further 
analysed by Håkansson since he probably wrote the text before the change. 
17 Norinder was one of the Moderates’ members of the Swedish parliament until 2006. 
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example Schlingmann, 2007-02-14). This is in line with the vote-maximisition-
theory developed by the authors above. 
Kirchheimer, one of the authors mentioned above, recognised the development 
of catch-all parties, ruled by a vote-maximising party-elite. There are indications 
that a similar development occurred in the Moderates, as we have showed in the 
actor-chapter (ch. 5.2). Sven Otto Littorin has said that the Moderates have 
evaluated the possibility of abolishing the membership system (“M helrenoverar 
partiet”, Dagens Nyheter, 2004-07-07). In addition, Norinder claims that the 
Moderates’ transformation was carried out by the actors (see ch. 5.1) without 
discussions within the party or the parliament group. Furthermore, he explains 
why the elite, Reinfeldt and his closest associates, were so powerful. First, they 
had the power to decide who will be commissioned to assignments in committees. 
Second, they had the power over the party’s economy which, according to 
Norinder, resulted in the forming of an inner circle. Third, they monitored the 
party’s press staff and therefore controlled the party’s external communication. 
Norinder argues that the elite “bulldozed colleagues in the party”18 (Norinder, 
2007-03-26).  
It is possible that Norinder exaggerate the power of the actors and how the 
actors have been acting since he is critical to the Moderates political change. Still, 
Schlingmann admits that the party organisation was heavily challenged by the 
leadership (2007-02-14). The party has probably developed a rather powerful elite 
and therefore we argue that Bäck and Möller’s description of Swedish parties as 
massparties should be revised (2003:99ff).  
When analysing the Moderates change from Przeworski and Sprague’s 
perspective it seems reasonable to believe that the actors were aware of the three 
problems that the authors’ described. First, the actors tried hard to convince the 
party organisation that the change was the right thing to do. Second, they tried to 
attract new groups of voters, for example by forming policies in areas like 
environment and welfare. According to Schlingmann, the Moderates dramatised 
the change in order to make people aware of it and obtain peoples’ interest. Third, 
the Moderates constantly repeated that “the ideology and ideas are the same but 
the solutions are new” (for example Wiklund, 2006:145-147 and Schlingmann 
14/2-2007). By contrast, Norinder argues that the Moderates in fact “abandoned 
their traditional ideology and withdraw controversial standpoints” (2007-03-26). 
“The motive was to attract social-democratic voters” (ibid.). Schlingmann do not 
agree: “It is not about asking a group of voters what they want and then give it to 
them. It is about giving the right answers to the contemporary problems in the 
society” (Schlingmann, 2007-02-14). However, Schlingmann proceeds, “the 
Moderates based their change on which problems people experience”(ibid.). 
Together this offers some support for the vote-maximisation motive even 
though this support is somewhat ambiguous.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
18 Norinder gives an example from his work in the Moderates employment committee. When 
Reinfeldt and his associates (the actor) had decided to change, the objections from the committee 
were ignored and Anders Borg took over the responsibility for employment issues. 
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Parliamentary influence is not considered as a motive in any of our material 
although it is possible that the Moderates’ changed in order to make it easier to 
co-operate with the other parties in the non-socialist alliance. However, we have 
not found any support for this vague speculation. 
Internal cohesion and parliamentary influence have had support in literature 
by various authors since Sjöblom (1968) wrote his in influential dissertation. 
However, we have not found any particular correspondence between the 
Moderates change and the nature of these two motives. Internal cohesion is easily 
dismissed. Per Schlingmann says that significant changes in the party demands 
support from the organisation, however, he admits that the leadership “challenged 
the party organisation forcefully” (Schlingmann, 2007-02-14). Obviously, 
Norinder do not dispute this view (Norinder, 2007-03-26).  
The motives mentioned by the actors, viability and societal change, have not 
been found in literature. Presumably because these are preferential motives and 
not strategic motives which often is the focus in theoretical literature. Sjöblom 
deals with preferential motives when he argues that parties strive for program 
realisation. However, he does not discuss what the parties preferences are since it 
is different from party to party. 
9.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has dealt with vote-maximisation to a great extent. The literature has 
showed that the motive is (increasingly) important and in what situations parties 
develop vote-maximisation strategies. This corresponds well with the situation 
before and during the Moderates change. Our conclusion is that this chapter gives 
strong support for vote-maximisation but the support in literature does not 
correspond completely with our material about the actors. The result has to be 
considered with caution. 
Internal cohesion and parliamentary influence got support in literature but we 
could not distinguish a clear correspondence with the Moderates situation. 
Therefore the support must be regarded as weak. 
We have not found any theoretical literature regarding societal change and 
viability, presumably due to the nature of preferential motives. Hence, no support 
in this chapter. 
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10 Conclusion 
The various motives discussed in chapters 6-9 will in this chapter be assessed 
separately. Each motive will be weighed in accordance to our previous 
conclusions found in the investigation chapters (6-9) and in relation to each other. 
This enables us to interpret the importance each motive might hold and, 
furthermore, reach conclusions on what particular motive we regard as most 
significant. Our findings above reject the parliamentary influence-motive and the 
internal cohesion-motive and we will therefore not discuss them further in this 
conclusion. To make our findings more clear and comprehensible we have 
compiled the results in a table (fig. 1). 
 
Figure 1 
Support for the motives in the various chapters.  
 A B C D 
Viability Strong Strong  Strong  - 
Societal change Strong - Strong  - 
Vote-maximisation Fair Fair Fair Strong 
Parliamentary 
influence 
- - - Weak 
Internal cohesion - Weak - Weak  
 
10.1 Viability 
We find strong evidence suggesting that the Moderates’ stated change was a result 
of the actors’ will to abondon the party’s prior politics due to its unrealistic 
formation. This “new” approach, they said, was more realistic and, by contrast to 
their prior party’s policies, possible to implement.  
Apart from the D-section, all investigation chapters above supported this 
viability-approach making it the most valuable motive (together with societal 
change, as we shall see below). In the A-section, viability received a very strong 
support. In the scheme of analysis (see Appendix), the support was almost total 
apart from its weak Position and Stability within the TV/radio category. However, 
due to this motive’s great support in the remaining two categories, especially in 
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Medborgaren which we qualified as the stronger category, we consider it justified 
to label this motive as Strong in our result’s figure (fig. ?). It received strong 
support in the B-section as well, due to Reinfeldts’ ideas in 1995, especially in the 
works Nostalgitrippen and the highly critical article ”M måste visa att de bryr 
sig”, and how these corresponds with his way of thinking during the launch of the 
New Moderates. In the C-section, we declared how both Blair and Clinton used 
viability as a motive for the change of their respective parties. It makes the 
support for the viability motive stronger even though we regard this chapter as 
less important than the previous two.  
Viability was not supported in the D-chapter were we investigated theoretical 
literature. One plausible explanation is that viability is a preferential motive and 
that preferential motives are seldom analysed specifically. Scholars have showed 
a much greater interest for parties’ strategic actions which is reasonable since the 
strategic behaviour is easier to generalise onto other parties (see ch. 3.2 and 9.2).  
10.2 Societal change 
Societal change is not, as figure 1 shows, an equally strong motive as viability. 
However, we do believe it is of some value since it recieves very strong support in 
the A-section. In the B-section, on the other hand, it receives no support 
whatsoever. How can this be explained? We interpret this as the party either (1) 
adapted to a particular change that did in fact take place in society right before 
they declared their change or (2) that this motive was only used in order to justify 
their declared change. We are leaning towards the first explanation, mainly due to 
Per Schlingmann’s response to what the societal change actually consisted of19 
(see ch. 6.5).  
The C-section gave strong support for societal change but we argued above 
that this chapter is of less relevance compared to the previous two. In 10.1 we also 
discussed why preferential motives not were mentioned in section D and the same 
goes for societal change since we consider it too to be a preferential motive. 
Together, the support for societal change is virtually as strong as for viability. 
The absent support in the B-chapter raised some doubts whether the change really 
was a response to societal changes, but Per Schlingmann offered a fairly 
reasonable explanation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
19 Lack of productivity has been replaced with lack of jobs. 
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10.3 Vote-maximisation 
As noted above, strategic motives are frequently studied. Vote-maximisation is 
perhaps the most studied strategic motive and we received strong support for it in 
the D-chapter. We saw that the traditional mass-parties in Sweden are 
transforming into vote-maximising catch-all parties and that the Moderates have 
been identified with this type of transformation after the change in 2003.  
We have also explained that this kind of strategic motives are often denied by 
the parties themselves. This might be an explanation to why vote-maximisation 
got less support (“fair”) in the chapters dealing with the parties own statements. 
The fact that vote-maximisation got some support in both section A and B 
suggests that it could have been a considerably important motive. It was expected 
that the parties we used as analogy-examples in section C would be careful with 
revealing vote-maximisation as a motive. Relying on other scholars we consider 
the support for this motive as fair. Thus, the support for the motive increases 
although the C-chapter is less important than the previous two.  
If vote-maximisation was an important motive for the actors, they should have 
been convinced that this particular change would gain more votes. This seems 
reasonable since Per Schlingmann said that the aim was to change the Moderates 
into a party that everyone could vote on (ch.6.5). Still, Sven-Otto Littorin claimed 
that he was not certain that such a change would improve the Moderates opinion 
figures; it could have been the other way around (ch. 6.5). This could be in line 
with one of Przeworski and Sprague’s mentioned problems with vote-
maximisation: parties have to keep their traditional voters while trying to attract 
new voters (ch. 9). 
Strategic motives as vote-maximisation are difficult to compare with 
preferential motives as viability and societal change. They can work together as 
Sjöblom shows (see ch. 3.2). Program realisation includes realisation of 
preferences and the strategic considerations are according to this theory made in 
order to be able to attain these preferences. Having policies that are viable and 
adjusted to societal changes are regarded as preferential motives by us. However, 
it is possible that the actors were trying to vote-maximise in different ways while 
at the same time trying to obtain their preferences. It is also possible that these 
motives could work as proxys for vote-maximisation. They might simply be a 
better sounding explanation to the party’s attempt to gain more votes.  
In short, it is diffucult to say exactly how much vote-maximisation was a 
motive behind the Moderates’ change. 
10.4 Final discussion 
The motives revealed above do not exist independently. They worked in relation 
to each other and based on our findings we find that the motives above were all 
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parts of the party’s strategy for the 2006 election. It is important to point out, 
however, that it is not plausible for other parties to implement this particular 
strategy used by the Moderates. There are many contributing factors necessary for 
any party to reform in the way that Reinfeld proclaimed. It is not within our reach, 
however, to draw final conclusions regarding why the Moderates’ reform actually 
took place and why this happened during this particular time. Still, we find it 
necessary to proclaim a few points regarding this particular matter. These points 
are not drawn from any research but are based on our own thoughts that surfaced 
while writing this thesis. The following points can be of inspiration for future 
researchers and, as such, lead to a cumulative process in which the picture of the 
Moderates’ change becomes clearer.  
We argue that the particular reform persued by the Moderates’ were a direct 
consequence of the loss in the election 2002. After the election, the party seems to 
have realised how difficult it was for a typical conservative party to convince the 
public of its right-wing agenda. We believe that this is due to the fact that Sweden 
and its citizens have since the beginning of left-right politics built a strong sense 
of left-wing values due to the state’s traditionally left-wing government. The main 
actors within the Moderates were probably aware of this and in order to improve 
their election results the party had to revitalise its political agenda and proclaim 
this as much as possible to the citizens of Sweden. Also, it is legitimate to assume 
that the Moderates’ reform would never have happened had the prior actors within 
the elite never left their positions. We have shown that the new and central actors 
were all extremely vital for the launch of the New Moderates. We consider these 
two factors (loss in election 2002 and the new actors) to be central when 
discussing the party’s reform. 
We also feel the need to point out the importance of the media, a source of 
great importance for political parties. This medium is used in order to convince, or 
atleast influence, the voters’ behaviour. If media had been of less importance, as it 
was only some decades ago, we argue that the Moderates reform would have been 
of less extreme measures. The vote-maximisation strategy would at least been of 
less importance since it implies for a party to reach out to its voters as broadly as 
possible. 
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11 Appendix 
11.1 Findings TV/Radio 
Motive  Material  Placement Actor 
 
Viability Speech (Almedalsveckan, Reoccurring FredrikReinfeldt
  2006-07-05, SVT) (4x) 
 Societal change  Interview (Utfrågningen, Reoccurring Fredrik Reinfeldt 
   2006-09-03, SVT) (2x) 
Vote-maximisation Interview (Utfrågningen, Reoccurring Fredrik Reinfeldt 
  2006-09-03, SVT) (2x) 
Viability Debate (Slutdebatten, Subtle Fredrik Reinfeldt 
   2006-09-14, SVT) 
Vote-maximisation Interview (Gomorron Subtle Fredrik Reinfeldt 
   Sverige, 2006-09-04, SVT)  
Vote-maximisation Interview (SR Ekot, Emphasised Fredrik Reinfeldt 
   2006-04-22) 
Internal cohesion Interview (SR Ekot, Subtle Fredrik Reinfeldt 
   2006-08-27) 
Societal change Interview (SR Ekot, Emphasised Fredrik Reinfeldt 
   2006-08-27) 
Vote-maximisation Interview (SR Ekot, Subtle Fredrik Reinfeldt 
  2006-08-27) 
Viability Interview (SR Ekot, Subtle Fredrik Reinfeldt 
   2006-08-27) 
Vote-maximisation Interview (SR Ekot, Reoccurring Fredrik Reinfeldt 
   2005-03-05)  (3x) 
Societal change Interview (SR Ekot, Emphasised Fredrik Reinfeldt 
   2005-03-05) 
 
Results 
 
Motive   Frequency Position Stability 
 
Viability  3 Subtle None  
Vote-maximisation  4 Emphasised Poor 
Societal change  3 Emphasised Poor 
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Internal cohesion  1 Subtle None 
Parliamentary influence 0 - None 
11.2 Findings newspapers 
Motive  Material  Placement Actor 
 
Viability Article (SvD, Subtle Fredrik Reinfeldt 
   20050925) 
Viability Comment (SvD, Subtle Anders Borg 
   20061003) 
Vote-maximisation Article (SvD, Emphasised Per Schlingman 
   20041303)   
Viability Article (SvD, Subtle Per Schlingman 
   20041303) 
Vote-maximisation Article (SvD, Subtle Per Schlingman 
   20062809) 
Societal change Article (DN,  Emphasised Reinfeldt & Borg 
   20060203) 
Societal change Article (GP,  Emphasised Fredrik Reinfeldt 
   20060318) 
Societal change Article (GP,  Emphasised Fredrik Reinfeldt 
   20060811) 
Vote-maximisation Article (GP,  Subtle Fredrik Reinfeldt 
  20060822) 
Societal change Article (GP,  Subtle Per Schlingmann 
   20060310) 
 
Results 
 
Motive   Frequency Stability Position 
 
Societal change  4 Stable Emphasised 
Viability  3 Very stable Subtle 
Vote-maximisation  2 Poor Subtle 
Internal cohesion  - - -  
Parliamentary influence - - - 
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11.3 Findings Medborgaren  
Motive  Material  Placement Actor 
       
Viability Article (nr. 4, 2003) - Sven-Otto Littorin 
Viability/vote- Reinfeldts presentation -  Fredrik Reinfeldt 
maximisation (nr. 4, 2003) 
Societal change Leader (nr. 4, 2005) - Sven-Otto Littorin 
Viability Leader (nr. 4, 2005) Subtle Sven-Otto Littorin 
 Internal cohesion Article (nr. 4, 2005)  Reoccurring - 
 Vote-maximisation Article (nr. 4, 2005) Subtle -  
Vote-maximisation Article (nr. 2, 2006) - - 
Societal change Article (nr. 2, 2006) - - 
Societal change Article (nr. 3, 2006) - - 
Societal change Article (nr. 3, 2006) - - 
Viability Leader (nr. 3, 2006) - - 
 
Results 
 
Motive   Frequency Stability Position 
 
Viability  4 Stable Emphasised 
Societal change  4  Stable Emphasised 
Vote-maximisation  3 Stable Subtle 
Internal cohesion  1 - Emphasised  
Parliamentary influence - - - 
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